Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

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Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-11-29, 11:16

I'll try to translate and comment some passages of The Sickness Unto Death (Sygdommen til Døden) by Kierkegaard. (The best place for this thread is probably the Literature forum. The moderator will put it there, if he wants).




A. At Fortvivlelse er Sygdommen til Døden


A) Fortvivlelse er en Sygdom i Aanden, i Selvet, og kan saaledes være et Tredobbelt: fortvivlet ikke at være sig bevidst at have et Selv (uegentlig Fortvivlelse); fortvivlet ikke at ville være sig selv; fortvivlet at ville være sig selv.


Mennesket er Aand. Men hvad er Aand? Aand er Selvet. Men hvad er Selvet? Selvet er et Forhold, der forholder sig til sig selv, eller er det i Forholdet, at Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv; Selvet er ikke Forholdet, men at Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv. Mennesket er en Synthese af Uendelighed og Endelighed, af det Timelige og det Evige, af Frihed og Nødvendighed, kort en Synthese. En Synthese er et Forhold mellem To. Saaledes betragtet er Mennesket endnu intet Selv.
I Forholdet mellem To er Forholdet det Tredie som negativ Eenhed, og de To forholde sig til Forholdet, og i Forholdet til Forholdet; saaledes er under Bestemmelsen Sjel Forholdet mellem Sjel og Legeme et Forhold. Forholder derimod Forholdet sig til sig selv, saa er dette Forhold det positive Tredie, og dette er Selvet.


Translation:


A. That despair is the sickness unto death.

A) Despair is a sickness in the spirit, in the self, and it may be three-fold: despair at not being aware of having a self (improper despair); despair at not willing to be oneself; despair at willing to be oneself.

The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation, that relates itself to itself - or it is, in the relation, that the relation relates itself to itself; the self is not the relation, but that the relation relates itself to itself.
The human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity - in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Regarded this way, the human being is not yet a self.
In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate themselves to the relation, and in the relation to the relation; thus, regarded as «soul», the relation is between soul and body; on the contrary, if the relation relates itself to its own self, so this relation is the positive third, and this is the self.



Comment:

Man is «spirit» (Aand), Kierkegaard says. Spirit is the «self» (Selv), and the self is a «relation» (Forhold) between two elements, «that relates itself» (der forholder sig) «to itself» (til sig selv) - that is, the self is a relation which is in relation to itself. The self is not the relation [between two elements], but it is the relation that relates itself to itself.
What are the parts that establish the relation? Kierkegaard says that this relation is «a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity» (en Synthese af Uendelighed og Endelighed, af det Timelige og det Evige, af Frihed og Nødvendighed). A synthesis is a relation between two parts - for instance, between «soul» (Sjel), which is freedom, and «body» (Legeme), which is necessity. But the synthesis is not the «self». The synthesis is «the third negative unity» (det Tredie som negativ Eenhed): it is negative, because it negates the terms that form the synthesis. It negates them because it is not them, but a third reality, different from them. The third term is thus a negation of both terms - which, in turn, «relate themselves to the relation» (de To forholdet sig til Forholdet) (since the relation is different from them). That the terms of the relation relate themlselves to the relation means that their difference is not annihilated by the synthesis - they are not assimilated to the synthesis - but remain in their essence beyond the relation - that is, their difference gets confirmed, so that they still remain closed in their essence, independent of each other, despite the relation between them. This negative unity is not the self, but a mere justaposition of counterposed elements, which lie side by side like a simple fact. But that the relation is negative allows the free reception of such negative relation, and of the elements that form it. The self, thus, is different from such a static and negative relation. The self is such negative relation that freely relates itself to itself - that is, that freely accepts such negative unity. This means that the self is the negative relation which relates itself to itself - in other words, the self is a relation between two negative parts. This new unity is a «positive third» (det positive Tredie). This positive unity is the self. It is positive because it is a relation between two identical elements which, for this reason, form a true unity. That is, the synthesis is now a relation that harmonises completely the elements of the relation. This pacific relation, however, does not eliminate the opposition between the elements which form the first negative unity. Indeed, here is the problem of man; for relating oneself to the negative relation means that one has to accept the negative relation, but such reception can address to a single part of the negative relation – since it is a juxtaposition of opposite elements - which can be easely taken for the whole.
So, the first relation between soul and body - between the temporal and the eternal, the freedom and the necessity - is a self when it becomes aware of itself - or «relates itself to itself» (forholder sig selv till sig selv), and so it runs the risk of the partial reception of the negative relation.
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-11-30, 10:37

Et saadant Forhold, der forholder sig til sig selv, et Selv, maa enten have sat sig selv, eller være sat ved et Andet.
Er Forholdet, der forholder sig til sig selv, sat ved et Andet, saa er Forholdet vistnok det Tredie, men dette Forhold, det Tredie, er saa dog igjen et Forhold, forholder sig til hvad der har sat hele Forholdet.
Et saadant deriveret, sat Forhold er Menneskets Selv, et Forhold, der forholder sig til sig selv, og i at forholde sig til sig selv forholder sig til et Andet.




Translation:

Such relation, that relates itself with itself - this is the self - must either have constituted itself, or have been constituted by another.
If a relation, that relates itself with itself, is constituted by another, such relation is undoubtedly the third, but this relation - the third - is surely a relation that in turn relates itself to that which has constituted the whole relation.
The human self is such a derived, constituted relation - a relation which relates itself to itself, and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another.




Comment:

Here, Kierkegaard says that the relation that everyone is, must either have constituted (sat) itself (that is, the self has constituted itself) - or have been constituted by another (ved et Andet) (in this case, the self is not the force which has constituted itself, but there is another "entity" which has constituted the self). In the second case, the relation which relates itself to itself - the positive third - in turn can relates itself to the «other» which has constituted the self as a relation which relates itself to itself (forholder sig til hvad der har sat hele Forholdet).
Everyone is such a self constituted by «another».

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-01, 10:44

Deraf kommer det, at der kan blive to Former for egentlig Fortvivlelse. Havde Menneskets Selv sat sig selv, saa kunde der kun være Tale om een Form, den ikke at ville være sig selv, at ville af med sig selv, men der kunde ikke være Tale om, fortvivlet at ville være sig selv. Denne Formel er nemlig Udtrykket for hele Forholdets (Selvets) Afhængighed, Udtrykket for, at Selvet ikke ved sig selv kan komme til eller være i Ligevægt og Ro, men kun ved i at forholde sig til sig selv at forholde sig til Det, som har sat hele Forholdet.



Translation:

Hence there can be two forms of despair properly so called. If human self had constituted itself, there could be only one form, that of not willing to be one's own self, to get rid of oneself, but there could not be the despairingly willing to be oneself. This formula is namely the expression for the wholly dependence of the relation (of the self), the expression for the fact that the self by itself cannot come to or be in equilibrium and rest, but can do that only if, in relating itself to itself, it relates to that one, who constituted the whole relation.



Comment:
The despair (Fortvivlelse) is twofold: the first form is the despair of not willing to be one's own self (den ikke at ville være sig selv). It is the despair one could have if its self had constituted itself. I made my very own self, but now I want to be another person. I cannot accomplish this task, since my own self is already determined. This is the first kind of despair.
The second kind of despair is the despairingly willing to be oneself (fortvivlet at ville være sig selv). It depends on the fact that the self was constituted by «another» (not by itself) and due to such dependence (Afhængighed) the self can come to or be in equilibrium and rest only in relating itself to itself and, consequently, in relating itself to that one (Det), who constituted the whole relation. Thus the despair depends on the rejection of the dependence of the self from that (Det) one who constituted the whole relation and in willing to be oneself without any relation to that one (Det).

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-02, 10:55

Ja, det er saa langt fra, at denne anden Form af Fortvivlelse (fortvivlet at ville være sig selv) blot betegner en egen Art af Fortvivlelse, at tværtimod al Fortvivlelse tilsidst kan opløses i og tilbageføres paa den. Dersom en Fortvivlende er, som han mener det, opmærksom paa sin Fortvivlelse, ikke taler meningsløst om den, som om Noget, der hænder ham (...) og nu af al Magt ved sig selv og ene ved sig selv vil hæve Fortvivlelsen: saa er han endnu i Fortvivlelsen, arbeider sig med al sin formeentlige Arbeiden kun desto dybere i en dybere Fortvivlelse. Fortvivlelsens Misforhold er ikke et simpelt Misforhold, men et Misforhold i et Forhold, der forholder sig til sig selv, og er sat af et Andet, saa Misforholdet i hiint for sig værende Forhold tillige reflekterer sig uendeligt i Forholdet til den Magt, som satte det.



Translation:

It is so far from being true that this form of despair (despair at willing to be onself) designates just a particular form of despair, that on the contrary all despair can finally be reduced to and connected to this. If a desperate is, as he thinks, conscious of his despair, he doesn't talk meaninglessly about it, as of something that befalls him (...) and now with all his power he tries to abolish his despair by himself and only by himself, then he is still in despair, and with all his supposed labor he is only laboring himself deeper into a deeper despair. The disrelation of the despair is not simply a disrelation, but a disrelation in a relation, that relate itself to itself, and is constituted by another - so the disrelation in that relation which is for itself also reflects itself infinitely in the relation to that power, who constituted it.


Comment:
All despair can «be reduced to and connected to» (opløses i og tilbageføres paa) this form of despair («despair at willing to be onself») (fortvivlet at ville være sig selv). If a desperate tries to abolish his despair «by himself and only by himself» (ved sig selv og ene ved sig selv) he will «reduce himself deeply to a deeper despair» (arbeider sig (...) kun desto dybere i en dybere Fortvivlelse). Nothing can be obtained by oneself, because such attitude makes the despair worse - since you are desperate when you rely only upon yourself.
Indeed, the despair is a «disrelationship» (Misforhold), namely a lack of relation, which comes after the original «relation that relate itself to itself» (et Forhold, der forholder sig til sig selv) «and is constituted by another» (og er sat af et Andet). This means that the self, in the disrelationship, doesn't relate itself to the infinite «power» (Magt) who constituted it. It doesn't relate «infinitely» (uendeligt) to that power.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-03, 10:18

Dette er nemlig Formelen, som beskriver Selvets Tilstand, | naar Fortvivlelsen ganske er udryddet: i at forholde sig til sig selv, og i at ville være sig selv grunder Selvet gjennemsigtigt i den Magt, som satte det.




Translation:

This is namely the formula, that describes the condition of the self, when despair is completely eradicated: by relating itself to itself, and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power which constituted it.



Comment:

The despair can be «eradicated» (udryddet) only if the self wants to «be» (være) itself and, in doing so, finds its foundation - or «is grounded» (grunder) - «in the power» (i den Magt) which constituted (or «posited») the self. In order to be fulfilled, the self has to relate itself to itself, then to the power which made the self. Without such relation, the despair won't disappear.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Itikar » 2014-12-03, 13:39

Hai avuto proprio una bella idea! Complimenti Massimiliano! :D
Fletto i muscoli e sono nel vuoto!
All corrections are welcome and appreciated.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-03, 17:53

Thank you, Itikar!

Even though I speak Danish only a little, I can read a text with the help of a dictionary, like these ones:

http://ordnet.dk/ods

http://sproget.dk/lookup?SearchableText=

http://en.bab.la/dictionary/danish-english/


I think this is one of the goals of learning languages.
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-06, 11:36

B

Fortvivlelses Mulighed og Virkelighed

Er Fortvivlelse et Fortrin eller en Mangel? Reent dialektisk er den begge Dele. Hvis man vilde fastholde den abstrakte Tanke Fortvivlelse, uden at tænke nogen Fortvivlet, saa maatte man sige: den er et uhyre Fortrin. Muligheden af denne Sygdom er Menneskets Fortrin for Dyret, og dette Fortrin udmærker ham ganske anderledes end den opreiste Gang, thi det tyder paa den uendelige Opreisthed eller Ophøiethed, at han er Aand. Muligheden af denne Sygdom er Menneskets Fortrin for Dyret; at være opmærksom paa denne Sygdom er den Christnes Fortrin for det naturlige Menneske; at være helbredet fra denne Sygdom den Christnes Salighed.
Altsaa det er et uendeligt Fortrin at kunne fortvivle; og dog er det ikke blot den største Ulykke og Elendighed at være det, nei det er Fortabelse. Saaledes er Forholdet mellem Mulighed og Virkelighed ellers ikke; er det et Fortrin at kunne være Det og Det, saa er det et endnu større Fortrin, at være det, det vil sige, det at være forholder sig som en Stigen til det at kunne være. Hvad Fortvivlelse derimod angaaer, saa forholder det at være sig som et Fald til det at kunne være; saa uendeligt som Mulighedens Fortrin er, saa dybt er Faldet.



Translation:

B
Possibility and reality of despair

Is despair an advantage or a defect? From a purely dialectical point of view, it is both. If one wants to consider the abstract notion of despair, without thinking of any real despairer, one might say: it is an eccellent advantage. The possibility of this sickness is man's advantage over the beast, and this advantage distinguishes him quite differently than the erect walk, for it reveals the infinite erectness or sublimity of being spirit. The possibility of this sickness is man's advantage over the beasts; being conscious of this sickness is the Christian's advantage over the natural man; being healed from this sickness is the Christian's blessedness.
Therefore it is an infinite advantage to be able to despair; nevertheless, it is not only the greatest accident and misery to be in despair; no, it is perdition. The relation between possibility and reality is not like this; if it is an advantage to be able to be this or that, it is a still greater advantage to be something; this means that being something is better than being able to be something. In the matter of despair, on the contrary, being is worse than being able to be. As infinite is the advantage of possibility, so deep is the fall.


Coomment:

Despair is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Withouth thinking of any real person, despair is an advantage. The possibility of this sickness is the distinctive trait of the human being, which distinguishes him from the animal. A Christian can be aware of this sickness. Being healed of this sickness is a bliss.
However, being in despair is really a «perdition» (Fortabelse). Usually to be is better than the ability to be. Here, in the case of despair, being in despair is worse than being able to despair - being in despair is a «fall» (Fald) in relation to being able to despair.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-07, 11:19

Det der altsaa i Forhold til Fortvivlelse er det Stigende er ikke at være det. Dog er atter denne Bestemmelse tvetydig. Det er ikke med det ikke at være fortvivlet som med det ikke at være halt, blind o. d.. Dersom det ikke at være fortvivlet hverken betyder mere eller mindre end det ikke at være det, saa er det netop at være det. Det ikke at være fortvivlet maa betyde den tilintetgjorte Mulighed af at kunne være det; hvis det skal være sandt, at et Menneske ikke er fortvivlet, maa han i ethvert Øieblik tilintetgjøre Muligheden. Saaledes er Forholdet mellem Mulighed og Virkelighed ellers ikke. Thi vel sige Tænkerne, at Virkelighed er den tilintetgjorte Mulighed, men det er ikke ganske sandt, den er den udfyldte, den virksomme Mulighed. Her derimod er Virkeligheden (ikke at være fortvivlet), som derfor ogsaa er en Negtelse, den afmægtige, tilintetgjorte Mulighed; ellers er Virkelighed i Forhold til Mulighed en Bekræftelse, her en Benegtelse.




Translation:

So, in relation to despair, not being in despair is better. Yet this statement is ambiguous. Not being in despair is not like not being lame, blind, etc. If not being in despair means neither more nor less than not being it, then it is precisely to be it. Not being in despair must mean the annihilated possibility of being able to be it. If it has to be true that man is not in despair, he must every instant annihilate the possibility. The relation between possibility and reality is not like this. Thinkers say that reality is the annihilated possibility, but it is not entirely true; reality is the fulfilled, the effective possibility. Here, on the contrary, the reality ( not being in despair) - which therefore is a negation - is the impotent, annihilated possibility. Usually the reality, in relation to the possibility, is a confirmation, here it is a negation.


Comment:

Not being in despair is not better than being in despair. The sickness of despair is not like being lame, blind, etc., since, as Kerkegaard said before, being in despair is the prerogative of man over the beast. So, his conclusion is that «not being in despair» (ikke at være fortvivlet) is «like being it» (saa er det netop at være det). Then he says that not being in despair «must» (maa) mean «the annihilation of the possibility» (den tilintetgjorte Mulighed) «of being able» (af at kunne) «to be it» (være det). Indeed, the thing of not being in despair is not a condition of healing - that is, after the sickness of despair one is again healthy. Not being in despair is not yet being in despair, and in this condition one must «annihilate» (tilintetgjøre) «continuously» (i ethvert Øieblik) that possibility - the possibility of being in despair. Usually the «reality» (Virkelighed) is an actualization - a «reinforcement» (Bekræftelse) - of the «possibility» (Mulighed) (for instance, being happy is an actualization of the possibility of being happy), here the reality - i.e. «not being in despair» (ikke at være Fortvivlet) - is a «negation» (Benegtelse) of the possibility of being in despair.
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-08, 11:42

Fortvivlelse er Misforholdet i en Syntheses Forhold, som forholder sig til sig selv. Men Synthesen er ikke Misforholdet, den er blot Muligheden, eller, i Synthesen ligger Muligheden af Misforholdet. Var Synthesen Misforholdet, saa var Fortvivlelse slet ikke til, saa vilde Fortvivlelse være Noget, der laae i Menneskenaturen som saadan, det er, saa var det ikke Fortvivlelse; den vilde være Noget, der hændte Mennesket, Noget han leed, som en Sygdom, i hvilken Mennesket falder, eller som Døden, der er Alles Lod. Nei, det at fortvivle ligger i Mennesket selv; men var han ikke Synthese, kunde han slet ikke fortvivle, og var Synthesen ikke oprindeligt fra Guds Haand i det rette Forhold, kunde han heller ikke fortvivle.

Hvorfra kommer saa Fortvivlelsen? Fra Forholdet, hvori Synthesen forholder sig til sig selv, idet Gud, der gjorde Mennesket til Forholdet, ligesom slipper det ud af sin Haand, det er, idet Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv. Og deri, at Forholdet er Aand, er Selvet, deri ligger Ansvaret, under hvilket al Fortvivlelse er og er hvert Øieblik den er, hvor meget, og hvor sindrigt end skuffende sig selv og Andre, den Fortvivlede taler om sin Fortvivlelse som en Ulykke, ved en Forvexling som i hiint anførte Tilfælde af Svimmelhed, med hvilken Fortvivlelse, om end qvalitativ forskjellig, har meget tilfælles, da den under Bestemmelsen Sjel er hvad Fortvivlelse er under Bestemmelsen Aand, og svanger paa Analogier til Fortvivlelse.




Translation:

Despair is a disrelation in a relation of synthesis, that relates itself to itself. But the synthesis is not the disrelation, it is merely the possibility, or in the synthesis is the possibility of the disrelation. If the synthesis were the disrelation, the despair would not exist at all, for despair would be just something inherent in human nature as such, that is, it would not be despair; it would be something that happens to man, something he suffers, like a sickness in which a man falls, or like the death, which is the lot of all. No, the despairing depends on human self, but if he were not a synthesis, he could not at all despair, neither could he despair if the synthesis were not originally in the right relation by God's hands.
Where does despair come from? From the relation, wherein the synthesis relates itself to itself, at the same time that God, who made man in relation, in a way lets him get out of his hands, that is, at the same time that the relation relates itself to itself. And here, that the relation is spirit, is the self, here is the responsibility under which all despair lies every instant it exists, however much and however ingeniously the despairer, deceiving himself and others, may talk of his despair as a accident, with a confusion like the aforementioned case of vertigo, with which the despair, although qualitatively different, has much in common, since vertigo is under the category of soul what despair is under the category of spirit, and is pregnant with analogies to despair.


Comment:

Despair is a «disrelation» (Misforhold). The disrelation comes «from the relation» (fra Forholdet), or synthesis. So, «the synthesis is not the disrelation» (Synthesen er ikke Misforholdet), but the «possibility» (Mulighed) of the disrelation. Man is a synthesis. If he were not a synthesis, he could not despair (men var han ikke Synthese, kunde han slet ikke fortvivle). Man is a synthesis «of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity», as Kierkegaard write at the beginning of these pages, and the disrelation is not something which is inherent to the synthesis, but something that can happen after the synthesis is constituted, when the synthesis relates itself to itself in order to constitute the self. Here is the possibility of the disrelation. Kierkegaard says that this very moment, in which the synthesis starts the disrelation, happens when God «in a way lets the man get out of his hands» (ligesom slipper det ud af sin Haand). The synthesis, however, is «originally» (oprindeligt) constituted «by God's hand» (fra Guds Haand) «in the right relation» (i det rette Forhold); thus, «despairing depends on human self» (det at fortvivle ligger i Mennesket selv). Man can despair because he can get into a disrelation when the synthesis relates itself to itself (which is good, since «God created man in relation» - Gud (...) gjorde Mennesket til Forholdet), but rejects the right relation in which God had constituted him «in the beginning». The condition of disrelation is despair.
Man is responsible for his despair, because man only can break the right relation.
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby księżycowy » 2014-12-08, 12:37

Where has this awesome thread been hiding!

Good work, Massimiliano. I'll be sure to keep reading, so keep posting. :wink:
I find Kierkegaard's writings facinating.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-14, 11:56

I'm glad you like it!



Naar saa Misforholdet, Fortvivlelsen, er indtraadt, følger det saa af sig selv, at det vedbliver? Nei, det følger ikke af sig selv; hvis Misforholdet vedbliver, følger det ikke af Misforholdet, men af Forholdet, som forholder sig til sig selv. | Dette vil sige, for hver Gang Misforholdet yttrer sig, og i ethvert Øieblik det er til, maa der gaaes tilbage til Forholdet. See, man taler om, at et Menneske paadrager sig en Sygdom, f. Ex. ved Uforsigtighed. Saa indtræder da Sygdommen, og fra det Øieblik gjør den sig gjældende og er nu en Virkelighed, hvis Oprindelse bliver mere og mere forbigangen. Det vilde være baade grusomt og umenneskeligt, om man i eet væk vilde vedblive at sige »i dette Øieblik paadrager Du, den Syge, Dig denne Sygdom«, det er, om man i ethvert Øieblik vilde opløse Sygdommens Virkelighed i dens Mulighed. Det er sandt, at han paadrog sig Sygdommen, men det gjorde han kun een Gang, Sygdommens Vedbliven er en simpel Affølge af, at han een Gang paadrog sig den, dens Fremgang ikke i ethvert Øieblik at henføre til ham som Aarsag; han paadrog sig den, men man kan ikke sige, han paadrager sig den. Anderledes med det at fortvivle; ethvert Fortvivlelsens virkelige Øieblik er at tilbageføre til Mulighed, hvert Øieblik han er fortvivlet, paadrager han sig det; det er bestandigt den nærværende Tid, der vorder intet i Forhold til Virkeligheden tilbagelagt Forbigangent; i ethvert Fortvivlelsens virkelige Øieblik bærer den Fortvivlede alt det Foregaaende i Muligheden som et Nærværende. Dette kommer deraf, at at fortvivle er en Bestemmelse af Aand, forholder sig til det Evige i Mennesket. Men det Evige kan han ikke blive af med, nei, i al Evighed ikke; han kan ikke een Gang for alle kaste det fra sig, Intet er umuligere; han maa i ethvert Øieblik, hvor han ikke har det, have kastet eller kaste det fra sig – men det kommer igjen, det er, hvert Øieblik han er fortvivlet, paadrager han sig det at fortvivle. Thi Fortvivlelsen følger ikke af Misforholdet, men af Forholdet, som forholder sig til sig selv. Og Forholdet til sig selv kan et Menneske ikke blive af med, saa lidet som med sit Selv, hvad da forøvrigt er Eet og det Samme, da jo Selvet er Forholdet til sig selv.



Translation:

When the disrelation - the despair - has intervened, does it follow certainly that it persists? No, it does not follow certainly; if the disrelation persists, it does not originate from the disrelation, but from the relation which relates itself to itself. This means that when the disrelation shows itself, and every instant it exists, it must be traced to the relation. See, we talk about a man who contract a sickness, for instance through carelessness. So the illness begins, and from that moment it asserts itself and it is reality, whose origins recede more and more into the past. It would be both gruesome and inhuman if one in a way continues to say, "This instant you, the sufferer, contract this sickness", that is, if every instant one were to connect the actuality of the illness to its possibility. It is true that he asked for his sickness, but he did this only once; the sickness is a mere consequence of the fact that he once contracted it; its progress cannot be every moment attributed to him as if he were the cause of it; he contracted it, but one cannot say that he is contracting it. The despair is different: every actual instant of despair is to be connected to the possibility, every instant he is in despair, he is contracting it; it is constantly the present time, that in no way comes into existence in relation to a past reality. At every actual instant of despair the despairer bears all the foregoing past in possibility as a present. This comes from the fact that despair is a qualification of the spirit, in relation to the eternal in man. But he cannot get rid of the eternal, no, not to all eternity; he cannot once for all cast it from him, nothing is more impossible; every instant he does not possess it he must have cast or be casting it from him; but it comes back again, that is every instant he is in despair, he contracts the despair, since despair does not result from the disrelation, but from the relation that relates itself to itself. And man cannot get rid of the relation to itself, any more than of his self, which is moreover one and the same thing, since the self is a relation to itself.



Comment

The despair - or disrelation - «persists» (vedbliver) because the despairer every instant "asks for" (paadrager sig) the disrelation - that is, the sickness of despair depends at every instant on the relation which relates itself to itself.
The possibility of the disrelation is continually current, even if the sickness began in a past time. This means that the man who contracts the despair wants, at every instant, his despair. Since despair «is in relation to the eternal in man» (forholder sig til det Evige i Mennesket), and «from eternal one cannot get rid of» (det Evige kan han ikke blive af med), then «every instant» (i ethvert Øieblik) «he does not have it» (hvor han ikke har det) ("it" refers to the eternal in man) «he must have cast or be casting it from him» (han maa (...) have kastet eller kaste det fra sig). Man has not the eternal in him, because he cast it from him. However, «he cannot once for all cast it from him» (han kan ikke een Gang for alle kaste det fra sig), since «it comes back again» (men det kommer igjen), because this "eternal" is the man himself.
Since man is a synthesis of the eternal and the temporal, it is impossible to avoid once for all the relation to the "eternal" (Evige) in man. It comes back again, and at every moment the despairer must disrelate himself to the eternal which is in him, if he wants to persist in his disrelation - or "despair". So, the disrelation is always a present act of man, which takes place when the synthesis relates itself to itself without relating itself to the eternal part of the synthesis.
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-19, 9:38

C

Fortvivlelse er: »Sygdommen til Døden«

Dette Begreb Sygdommen til Døden maa dog tages paa en egen Maade. Ligefrem betyder det en Sygdom, hvis Ende, hvis Udgang er Døden. Saaledes taler man om en dødelig Sygdom eenstydigt med en Sygdom til Døden. I den Forstand kan Fortvivlelse ikke kaldes Sygdommen til Døden. Men christeligt forstaaet er Døden selv en Gjennemgang til Livet. Forsaavidt er, christelig, ingen jordisk, legemlig Sygdom til Døden. Thi vistnok er Døden det sidste af Sygdommen, men Døden er ikke det Sidste. Skal der i strængeste Forstand være Tale om en Sygdom til Døden, maa det være en, hvor det Sidste er Døden, og hvor Døden er det Sidste. Og dette er just Fortvivlelse.
Dog er Fortvivlelse i en anden Forstand endnu bestemtere Sygdommen til Døden. Det er nemlig saa langt som muligt fra, at man, ligefrem forstaaet, døer af denne Sygdom, eller at denne Sygdom ender med den legemlige Død. Tværtimod, Fortvivlelsens Qval er netop ikke at kunne døe. Den har saaledes mere tilfælles med den Dødssyges Tilstand, naar han ligger og trækkes med Døden og ikke kan døe. Saaledes er det at være syg til Døden det ikke at kunne døe, dog ikke som var der Haab om Livet, nei Haabløsheden er, at selv det sidste Haab, Døden, ikke er. Naar Døden er den største Fare, haaber man paa Livet; men naar man lærer den end forfærdeligere Fare at kjende, haaber man paa Døden. Naar saa Faren er saa stor, at Døden er blevet Haabet, saa er Fortvivlelse den Haabløshed end ikke at kunne døe.


Translation

C

Despair is sickness unto death

This concept of "sickness unto death" must be understood, however, in a peculiar sense. Literally, it means a sickness, whose ending, whose outcome is death. Thus we speak of a deadly sickness as synonymous of a sickness unto death. In this sense, despair cannot be called the sickness unto death. But if it is understood in a Christian sense, death itself is a passage into life. In such a way, from the Chrisian point of view no earthly, bodily sickness is unto death. Therefore, death is probably the end of a sickness, but death is not the end. If we are to speak in the strictest sense of a sickness unto death, it must be one where the end is death, and where death is the end. And this is just despair.
Yet in an even more specific sense despair is a sickness unto death. It is namely as far from truth as possible that one dies, literally understood, of this sickness, or that this sickness ends with a bodily death. On the contrary, the torment of despair is precisely not to be able to die. This has therefore much in common with the situation of a moribund, when he lies and struggles with death and cannot die. So, to be sick unto death is not to be able to die - however, not as though there were hope of life; no, the hopelessness means that even the last hope, death, is not there. When the death is the greatest danger, one hopes for life; but when one gets acquainted with an even more terrible fear, one hopes for death. So when the danger is so great that death has become the hope, despair is the hoplessness for not being able to die.



Comment:

"Sickness unto death" literally means a sickness which ends with the death of the sick person. So, the sickness unto death (Sygdommen til Døden), which Kierkegaard is talking about in his book, is not really a mortal sickness - indeed, it does not end with the death of the body. On the contrary, the «torment» (Qval) of such despair «is precisely not to be able to die» (er netop ikke at kunne døe). So, when a man is «sick unto death» (syg til Døden) he despairs because he cannot die - because of «not being able to die» (ikke at kunne døe). The despairer, in his despair, has no «hope for life» (Haab om Livet), but only a hope for death. He wants to die but he cannot die. «To be sick unto death is not to be able to die - however, not as though there were hope of life» (Saaledes er det at være syg til Døden det ikke at kunne døe, dog ikke som var der Haab om Livet): the sickness unto death means that one hopes for death, but, unfortunately, there is no possibility to die. There is in effect an «even more terrible danger» (end forfærdeligere Fare) than death. So the despairer hopes for death, because it is less painful than a danger that is more terrible than death. What is such more terrible danger? It is exactly «not to be able to die» (det ikke at kunne døe). Man despairs because he wants to die, but there is no hope for death: when the «danger» (Fare) is «so great» (saa stor) that death «has become the hope» (er blevet Haabet), despair is the «hoplessness» (Haabløshed) «for not being able to die» (end ikke at kunne døe) - that is, despair is the hopelessness caused by not being able to die.
«The torment of despair» (Fortvivlelsens Qval) is due to the fact that one cannot «die» (døe). What kind of death is this? This is not a bodily death, as Kierkegaard says above («In this sense, despair cannot be called the sickness unto death»). Kierkegaard talks here about the death of something which is not bodily, but spiritual. He alludes to this spiritual in man when he says that «even the last hope, death, is not» (selv det sidste Haab, Døden, ikke er). So, man despairs because a spiritual in him cannot die. That's the reason for his despair.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-21, 11:34

I denne sidste Betydning er da Fortvivlelse Sygdommen til Døden, denne qvalfulde Modsigelse, denne Sygdom i Selvet, evig at døe, at døe og dog ikke at døe, at døe Døden. Thi at døe betyder at det er forbi, men at døe Døden betyder at opleve det at døe; og lader dette sig eet eneste Øieblik opleve, saa er det dermed for evig at opleve det. Skulde et Menneske døe af Fortvivlelse, som man døer af en Sygdom, saa maatte det Evige i ham, Selvet, kunne døe i samme Forstand som Legemet døer af Sygdommen. Men dette er en Umulighed; Fortvivlelsens Døen omsætter sig bestandigt i en Leven. Den Fortvivlede kan ikke døe; »saa lidet som Dolken kan dræbe Tanker«, saalidet kan Fortvivlelsen fortære det Evige, Selvet, der ligger til Grund for Fortvivlelsen, hvis Orm ikke døer, og hvis Ild ikke udslukkes. Dog er Fortvivlelse just en Selvfortærelse, men en afmægtig Selvfortærelse, der ikke formaaer hvad den selv vil. Men hvad den selv vil er at fortære sig selv, hvilket den ikke formaaer, og denne Afmagt er en ny Form af Selvfortærelse, i hvilken dog Fortvivlelsen atter ikke formaaer hvad den vil, at fortære sig selv, det er en Potentsation eller Loven for Potentsationen. Dette er det Hidsende, eller det er den kolde Brand i Fortvivlelsen, dette Nagende, hvis Bevægelse er bestandigt ind efter, dybere og dybere i afmægtig Selvfortærelse. Det er saa langt fra at det er nogen Trøst for den Fortvivlede, at Fortvivlelsen ikke fortærer ham, det er lige det Modsatte, denne Trøst er just Qvalen, er just hvad der holder Naget ilive og Liv i Naget; thi just derover – ikke fortvivlede – men fortvivler han: at han ikke kan fortære sig selv, ikke kan blive af med sig selv, ikke kan blive til Intet. Dette er den potentserede Formel for Fortvivlelsen, Feberens Stigen i denne Selvets Sygdom.




Translation:

It is in this last meaning that despair is the sickness unto death, that haunting contradition, that sickness in the self, eternally to die, to die and yet not to die, to die the death. For dying means that all is over, but to die the death means that one lives the death; and allowing oneself to be able to experience this for a moment, is like an eternal experience of that. If a man might die of despair as one dies of a sickness, so the eternal in him, the self, must be able to die as the body dies of a sickness. But this is impossible: the dying of despair transforms itself constantly into a living. The despairing man cannot die; no more than "the dagger can slay thoughts" can despair destroy the eternal, the self, which is the ground of despair, whose worm does not die, and whose fire is not quenched. Yet despair is a destruction of the self, but it is an impotent destruction of the self, that does not accomplish what itself wills. But what itself wills is to destroy itself, which it does not accomplish, and this impotente is a new form of destruction of the self, in which the despair, again, does not accomplish what it wills - destroy itself - that is a strenghtening or a law for strenghtening. This is the excitement, or the cold fire in despair, the angst whose movement is constantly inward, deeper and deeper in an impotent destruction of the self. It's so far from being true that there is a consolation for the despairing man - since despair does not destroy him - that it is precisely the opposite, this consolation is precisely the torment, it is precisely this that keeps the pain alive and keeps life in the pain. For this reason he despairs - not to say despaired - because he cannot destroy himself, cannot get rid of himself, cannot become nothing. This is the potentiated formula for despair, the rising of the fever in the sickness of the self.




Comment:

To be sick unto death means to «live» (at opleve) «the death» (det at døe). Thus in the sickness a man does not die, but lives to experience death - he dies and yet does not die (at døe og dog ikke at døe). This particular death Kierkegaard is talking about is not the corporal death, but the death of the spiritual in man. He writes that this eternal cannot die: «If a man (Menneske) might (skulle) die (døe) of despair (af Fortvivlelse) as (som) one dies of a sickness, so (saa) the eternal (det Evige) in him (i ham), the self (Selvet), must (maatte) be able to (kunne) die as the body (Legemet) dies of a sickness. But this is an impossibility (en Umulighed)», since the self is not like the body, but a spiritual entity, which is eternal, that lives eternally. So, «the despairing man cannot die» (den Fortvivlede kan ikke døe), that is his eternal part in him cannot die; the despair cannot «destroy the eternal, the self» (fortære det Evige, Selvet), «which is the reason of despair» (der ligger til Grund for Fortvivlelsen): so, man despairs because of the eternal in him, because he cannot destroy the eternal in him, which is the self. So, despair is an «impotent» (afmægtig) «destruction of the self» (Selvfortærelse), of the «eternal» part in human being. But despair is impotent, because it cannot accomplish what it wills - to destroy the self. Such impotence strengthens the despair to its highest level (det er en Potentsation). Despair becomes thus a high force, «constantly inward» (bestandigt ind efter) and «deeper» (dybere), which tries to destroy the self. But it is not possible to destroy the self - the eternal. However, this is not a «consolation» (Trøst) for man. It is on the contrary «the torment» (Qvalen), since man despairs because «he cannot destroy himself» (han ikke kan fortære sig selv), «cannot become nothing» (ikke kan blive til Intet).The «nothing» that man wants to become is impossible to achieve: the «eternal» in man stands opposite to such reduction to nothing.
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-25, 10:42

En Fortvivlende fortvivler over Noget. Saaledes seer det et Øieblik ud, men det er kun et Øieblik; i samme Øieblik viser den sande Fortvivlelse sig eller Fortvivlelsen sig i sin Sandhed. Idet han fortvivlede over Noget, fortvivlede han egentlig over sig selv, og vil nu af med sig selv. Naar saaledes den Herskesyge, hvis Løsen er »enten Cæsar eller slet Intet«, ikke bliver Cæsar, saa fortvivler han derover. Men dette betyder noget Andet: at han, just fordi han ikke blev Cæsar, nu ikke kan udholde at være sig selv. Han fortvivler altsaa egentligen ikke over, at han ikke blev Cæsar, men over sig selv at han ikke blev Cæsar. Dette Selv, der, hvis det var blevet Cæsar, havde været ham al hans Lyst, i en anden Forstand forøvrigt lige saa fortvivlet, dette Selv er ham nu | det Utaaleligste af Alt. Det er i dybere Forstand ikke det, der er ham det Utaalelige, at han ikke blev Cæsar, men dette Selv, som ikke blev Cæsar, er ham det Utaalelige, eller endnu rigtigere, det der er ham det Utaalelige, er, at han ikke kan blive af med sig selv. Naar han var blevet Cæsar, saa var han fortvivlet blevet af med sig selv; men nu blev han ikke Cæsar, og kan fortvivlet ikke blive af med sig selv. Væsentligen er han lige fortvivlet, thi han har ikke sit Selv, han er ikke sig selv. Ved at være blevet Cæsar var han dog ikke blevet sig selv, men af med sig selv; og ved ikke at blive Cæsar fortvivler han over ikke at kunne blive af med sig selv. Det er derfor en overfladisk Betragtning (der da formodentligen aldrig har seet en Fortvivlet, end ikke sig selv), naar man om en Fortvivlet siger, som var dette hans Straf: han fortærer sig selv. Thi netop det er det han fortvivlet, og netop det er det, han til sin Qval ikke kan, da der ved Fortvivlelsen er gaaet Ild i Noget, som ikke kan brænde, eller ikke forbrænde, i Selvet.





Translation:

A despairing man is in despair over something. So it seems for an instant, but it is only an instant; in the same instant the true despair shows itself, or despair shows itself in its truth. At the same time he despaired of something, he really despaired of himself, and now he wants to get rid of himself. Thus when the ambitious man, whose watchword is «either Caesar or nothing», does not become Caesar, he despairs of that. But this signifies something else, that precisely because he did not become Caesar, now he cannot endure to be himself. So he is not in despair over the fact that he did not become Caesar, but over himself, for the fact that he did not become Caesar. This self, which, if it had become Caesar, it would have been to him all his delight - in another sense equally in despair - this self is the most intolerable thing to him. In a deeper sense it is not the fact that he did not become Caesar which is intolerable to him, but it is this self, which did not become Caesar, which is to him the most intolerable thing - or, more correctly, what is intolerable to him is that he cannot get rid of himself. If he had become Caesar, he would have been ridden of himself in his despair; but now he did not become Caesar, and he cannot desperately get rid of his self. Essentially he is equally (lige) in despair, for he has not his self, for he is not himself. By becoming Caesar in any case he would not have become himself but have got rid of himself; and by not becoming Caesar he is in despair over the fact that he could not get rid of himself. It is therefore a superficial remark (which has never seen a person in despair, not even one's own self) when one says about a man in despair, as if this were his punishment, «he destroy himself». For it is precisely this he despairs of, and it is precisely this he cannot do with is torment, since with his despair he goes up in flames for something which cannot neither burn, nor burn down - which is the self.



Comment

The true nature of despair is not to be in despair over an objective thing - over something outside of one's self, but precisely over one's own self. A man in despair despairs of himself (fortvivlede han egentlig over sig selv). The Danish verb forvivle comes from Low German vortwivelen (see also German verzweifeln "to despair" and zweifeln "to doubt"). Vortvivle means «to be unhappy, desperate, frustrated and puzzled by something ; to lose courage or hope». It derives from the word for «doubt», namely tvivl (http://ordnet.dk/ddo/ordbog?query=fortvivle). So, fortvivle means «to be hopeless, to be frustrated and distressed (by the doubt)». Kierkegaard does not say that man despairs because he cannot know himself, or because he cannot be himself; instead, he say the opposite. He writes that «he despaired (fortvivlede) of (over) himself (sig selv), and (og) now (nu) [he] wants (vil) to get rid (af med) of himself (sig selv)»: so, first of all he despairs/doubts of himself, then he wants to get free of himself. He does not trust himself; he doubts of himself. He wants to be something, but not himself, because he does not see himself. A man who doubts of himself may still want to be someone; he is not self-confident - he does not believe in himself and ignores what he really is. But still he wants to be someone. What he wants to be is thus just an imaginary thing, an imaginary person who exists only in his mind (for instance, Julius Caesar). Kierkegaard says that when one doubts of oneself and does not recognize what he really is, he wants to be an imaginary person - "Caesar" - and with this behaviour he tries to get rid of himself - that is of his real self, which is a «synthesis of the eternal and the temporal» (as Kierkegaard writes): «If («when» - naar) he (han) had (var) become (blevet) Caesar, he would have been (var) ridden (blevet af med) of himself (sig selv) in his despair (fortvivlet)». If he cannot become Caesar, he will be in despair over the fact that his self is not able to become Caesar. This is the reason of his despair: the fact that he cannot tolerate to be himself and he cannot be what he dreamed up. He cannot do what he wants with his self. His self is something which cannot be manipulated at will. So, his true self is the reason of his despair: «This self (Dette Selv), which (der), if (hvis) it (det) had (var) become (blevet) Caesar, it would have (havde) been (været) to him (ham) all (al) his (hans) delight (Lyst) - in another sense equally in despair - this self is the most intolerable thing (det Utaaleligste) to him». If he had become Caesar he would have been «in another sense equally in despair» (i en anden Forstand forøvrigt lige saa fortvivlet) because in this case his self would not be what it really is, but would have been visionarily transformed in another person's self. The self would be the victim of a delusion, because it is not possible to transform our self into another one's self. As Kierkegaard esplains, «by becoming Caesar in any case he would not have become himself but have got rid of himself» (Ved at være blevet Cæsar var han dog ikke blevet sig selv, men af med sig selv). Since he cannot become Caesar, he is in despair; so, he is in despair over the fact that he can be only himself - and he is in despair because he cannot tolerate to be himself: «that (det) which (der) is (er) intolerable (det Utaalelige) to him (ham) is (er) that (at) he (han) can (kan) not (ikke) get rid of (med af) himself (sig selv).
So, a man is in despair over the fact that he has not been able to «destroy himself» (fortære sig selv) by becoming a different self, chosen arbitrarily by him: «for it is precisely this he despairs of, and it is precisely this he cannot do with is torment» (Thi netop det er det han fortvivlet, og netop det er det, han til sin Qval ikke kan), since the self «cannot burn down» (kan (...) ikke forbrænde) by becoming a different self.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2014-12-29, 18:16

At fortvivle over Noget er altsaa endnu ikke egentlig Fortvivlelse. Det er Begyndelsen, eller det er, som naar Lægen siger om en Sygdom, den har endnu ikke erklæret sig. Det Næste er den erklærede Fortvivlelse, at fortvivle over sig selv. En ung Pige fortvivler af Elskov, altsaa hun fortvivler over Tabet af den Elskede, at han døde eller at han blev hende utro. Dette er ingen erklæret Fortvivlelse, nei, hun fortvivler over sig selv. Dette hendes Selv, som hun, hvis det var blevet »hans« Elskede, paa den livsaligste Maade var blevet af med, eller havde tabt, dette Selv er hende nu en Plage, naar det skal være et Selv uden »ham«; dette Selv, der var blevet hende, forøvrigt i en anden Forstand ligesaa fortvivlet, hendes Rigdom, er nu blevet hende en modbydelig Tomhed, da »han« er død, eller det er blevet hende en Afsky, da det minder hende om, at hun er bedragen. Forsøg det nu, siig til en saadan Pige: Du fortærer dig selv, og du skal høre hun svarer: »o, nei Qvalen er just, at jeg ikke kan det.«
At fortvivle over sig, fortvivlet at ville af med sig selv, er Formelen for al Fortvivlelse, saa derfor den anden Form | for Fortvivlelse, fortvivlet at ville være sig selv, kan føres tilbage til den første, fortvivlet ikke at ville være sig selv, ligesom vi i det Foregaaende opløste den Form fortvivlet ikke at ville være sig selv i den fortvivlet at ville være sig selv (cfr. A.). En Fortvivlende vil fortvivlet være sig selv. Men naar han fortvivlet vil være sig selv, saa vil han jo ikke af med sig selv. Ja, saa synes det; men naar man seer nærmere til, seer man dog, at Modsigelsen er den samme. Det Selv, han fortvivlet vil være, er et Selv han ikke er (thi at ville være det Selv, han i Sandhed er, er jo lige det Modsatte af Fortvivlelse), han vil nemlig løsrive sit Selv fra den Magt, som satte det. Men dette formaaer han trods al Fortvivlen ikke; trods al Fortvivlelsens Anstrængelse er hiin Magt den stærkere, og tvinger ham til at være det Selv, han ikke vil være. Men saaledes vil han jo dog af med sig selv, af med det Selv, han er, for at være det Selv, han selv har hittet paa. At være Selv, som han vil det, det vilde, om end i en anden Forstand lige saa fortvivlet, være ham al hans Lyst; men at tvinges til at være Selv, som han ikke vil være det, det er hans Qval, den er, at han ikke kan blive af med sig selv.



Translation

Thus to despair of something is not precisely despair. This is the beginning, or it is as when the physician says about a sickness, that it has not yet declared itself. The next step is the declared despair, despair of oneself. A young girl is in despair over love; so, she is in despair over the loss of her lover, because he died or because he became unfaithful. This is not declared despair, no, she despairs of herself. Her own self, which - if it had become »his« beloved - she would have joyfully got rid of, or would have lost, this self is now a plague to her, because it has to be a self without «him»; this self, which would have become - in another sense equally in despair - her wealth, has now become to her a loathsome emptiness, since «he» has died, or «he» has become an abomination to her, because it reminds her that she was betrayed. Try to say to such girl: «You are destroying yourself», and now you will hear her reply:«Oh, no, the torment is precisely that I cannot do it».
To despair over oneself, despairingly willing to be rid of oneself, is the formula for all despair, therefore the other form of despair (despairingly willing to be oneself) can be brought back to the first one (despairingly not willing to be oneself), as we in the foregoing resolved the form "despairingly not willing to be oneself" in "despairingly willing to be onself" (cf. part A). A despairing man wants despairingly to be himself. But if he despairingly wants to be himself, he certainly does not want to get rid of himself. Yes, it seems so. But if one checks more closely, one comprehends that the contradiction is a sameness. The self which he despairingly wills to be is a self which he is not (for to will to be the self which one really is, is precisely the opposite of despair); he wants namely to free his self of the power which constituted it. But this cannot be done, notwithstanding all his despair; notwithstanding all his despairingly effort, such power is the strongest, and it compels him to be the self he does not want to be. But so he wants to get rid of himself, of his self - which he is - in order to be the self he himself thought up. To be a self as he wills to be, would be - although in another sense equally in despair - his delight; but to be compelled to be a self he does not want to be is his torment, that is, that he cannot get rid of himself. In his despair, the despairing man try to live in his narrow life, without any relation to «that power» which constituted him, without being what he really is - a relation of the infinite and the finite, as Kierkegaard says.



Comment

«The declared despair» (den erklærede Fortvivlelse) is «despair over oneself» (at fortvivle over sig selv). A young girl wants to be loved by her lover. If she is loved, she loses herself. But if she is not loved, she does not lose her self, so her self becomes a plague (en Plage), a torment, and she cannot tolerate it. Her self which is now a «loathsome emptiness» (modbydelig Tomhed) to her. This girl tried to destroy her self in the love, but she failed, and now she is complaining over the fact that she was not able to «destroy» (fortære) herself: « (...) the torment is precisely that I cannot do it» - namely «destroy myself» (o, nei Qvalen er just, at jeg ikke kan det).
Any kind of despair is «despairingly willing to be rid of oneself» (fortvivlet at ville af med sig selv); therefore the second form of despair Kierkegaard talks about in section A - «despairingly willing to be oneself» (fortvivlet at ville være sig selv) can be solved in the first one - «despairingly not willing to be oneself» (fortvivlet ikke at ville være sig selv). Indeed, when «a despairing man (En Fortvivlende) wants (vil) despairingly (fortvivlet) to be (være) himself» (sig selv), «he certainly does not want to get rid of himself». But this «contradiction is a sameness» (Modsigelsen er den samme): that is, «despairingly willing to be oneself» (fortvivlet at ville være sig selv)does not mean that one wants to be the real self, but another self - an imaginary, unreal, utopistic, idealistic self which one «thought up» (hittet paa) - and in doing so the desperate person indirectly rejects his real self, gets rid of himself, does not want to be his authentic self, he despairingly does not want to be himself. But the true self is consituted by a power which is the strongest (stærkere), so it is not possible to destroy it. In trying to become «a self which he is not» (et Selv han ikke er), a man wants to «free (løsrive) «his self (sit Selv) of the power (fra den Magt) which (som) constituted (satte) it» (det) - which is God. But God is too powerful, so the despair - which arise from the failed attempt to destroy the self - will never end.
Last edited by Massimiliano B on 2015-01-14, 11:56, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2015-01-02, 11:40

Socrates beviste Sjelens Udødelighed af, at Sjelens Sygdom (Synden) ikke fortærer denne, som Legemets Sygdom fortærer Legemet. Saaledes kan man ogsaa bevise det Evige i et Menneske deraf, at Fortvivlelsen ikke kan fortære hans Selv, at dette just er Modsigelsens Qval i Fortvivlelsen. Var der intet Evigt i et Menneske, saa kunde han slet ikke fortvivle, men kunde Fortvivlelsen fortære hans Selv, saa var der alligevel ingen Fortvivlelse til.
Saaledes er Fortvivlelse, denne Sygdom i Selvet, Sygdommen til Døden. Den Fortvivlede er dødssyg. Det er i en ganske anden Forstand end det gjælder om nogen Sygdom, de ædleste Dele, Sygdommen har angrebet; og dog kan han ikke døe. Døden er ikke Sygdommens Sidste, men Døden er i eet væk det Sidste. At frelses fra denne Sygdom ved Døden er en Umulighed, thi Sygdommen og dens Qval – og Døden er just ikke at kunne døe.
Denne er Tilstanden i Fortvivlelse. Om det end nok saa meget undgaaer den Fortvivlede, om det end nok saa meget (hvilket da især maa gjælde om den Art Fortvivlelse, der er Uvidenhed om at være Fortvivlelse) lykkes den Fortvivlede ganske at have tabt sit Selv, og tabt det saaledes, at det ikke mærkes i mindste Maade: Evigheden vil saa dog gjøre det aabenbart, at hans Tilstand var Fortvivlelse, og fornagle ham hans Selv, saa Qvalen dog bliver, at han ikke kan blive af med sit Selv, og det bliver aabenbart, at det var en Indbildning med, at det var lykkedes ham. Og saaledes maa Evigheden gjøre, fordi det at have et Selv, at være et Selv, er den største, den uendelige Indrømmelse, der er gjort Mennesket, men tillige Evighedens Fordring paa ham.



Translation

Socrates proved the immortality of the soul from the fact that the sickness of the soul (the sin) does not destroy it, as the sickness of the body destroyes the body. So also one can prove the eternal in man from the fact that despair cannot destroy his self, that this is just the torment of contradiction in despair. Were there no eternal in man, he could not despair at all; but if despair could destroy his self, then there would be no despair.
Thus despair, this sickness in the self, is the sickness unto death. The despairing man is mortally sick. In a quite different sense than it is valid about certain sicknesses, the sickness has attacked the most noblest parts; and yet he cannot die. Death is not the last phase of the sickness; but death is continuously the last phase. To be saved from this sickness by death is an impossibility, for the sickness and its torment - and the death - is just that one cannot die.
This is the situation in despair. Even though this eludes the despairer, even though he succeedes in having lost his self (this must be valid especially for that kind of despair, which is unawareness of being in despair) and lost in such a way he by no means perceives it: eternity will make it clear that his situation was despair, and it will nail him to his self so that the torment surely remains that he cannot get rid of his self, and it will be clear that it was an illusion that he had succeeded in doing so. And so eternity has to do, since to have a self, to be a self, is the greatest concession made to man, but at the same time it is the eternity's demand upon him.




Comment

Socrates «proved» (beviste) the «immortality» (Udødelighed) of the soul: ha said that «the sickness of the soul (the sin)» (Sjelens Sygdom (Synden)) «does not destroy it [= the soul]» (ikke fortærer denne). Kierkegaard proves that there is «the eternal in man» (det Evige i et Menneske) from the fact that «despair cannot destroy his self» (Fortvivlelsen ikke kan fortære hans Selv), and this is the «contradiction» (Modsigelse) that causes «torment» (Qval) in the situation of despair. Man can despair because there is the eternal in him: Kierkegaard says «If there were no eternal in man, he could not despair at all» (Var der intet Evigt i et Menneske, saa kunde han slet ikke fortvivle). Man can despair because his self has the eternal inside, which cannot be destroyed - which is the cause of man's despair. Notwithstanding his sickness unto death, «he cannot die» (kan han ikke døe). The «sickness unto death» is a situation of continuous state of dying: the sick person experiences the «last» (Sidste) phase - the death - without actually passing away; «death is continuously the last phase» (Døden er i eet væk det Sidste) of a person in the condition of the sickness unto death. The «death» of the «sickness unto death» is thus a perpetually coming death, an unattainable death which is the longing of the «sick» person. As Kierkegaard says, «the death is just that one cannot die» (Døden er just ikke at kunne døe): the «sick» man dies continuously due to the «impossibility» (Umulighed) to die of his sickness - namely, «to destroy his self» (fortære hans Selv). To have been able to destroy the self is just an «illusion» (Indbildning); the eternity returns again, and its «demand» (Fordring) from man is «to have a self, to be a self» (at have et Selv, at være et Selv) - thus, to establish the right relation to his self.

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Massimiliano B
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2015-02-21, 17:59

Translating and commenting Sygdommen til Døden from Danish to English requires too time. So, I resolved to translate and comment it from Danish to Italian. But I don't think someone could be interested in reading my work. So, I think I won't post anything here in the near future.

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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Ludwig Whitby » 2015-02-22, 9:54

Ok. Jeg ville bare si at jeg likte det. Dine oversettelser hjalp meg forstå den her arkaiske dansken og dine kommentarer hjalp meg forstå de vanskeligere deler. Jeg kommer til å fortsette alene nå og jeg tror ikke det blir vanskelig siden jeg har skjønt de grunnleggende ideer og begrep.

Får jeg kontakte deg på Facebook om jeg sliter med å forstå noe? Og hvor mye norsk forstår du?

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Massimiliano B
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Re: Kierkegaards Sygdommen til Døden

Postby Massimiliano B » 2015-02-22, 11:24

Hi Ludwig Whitby. I can understand your Norwegian (I'm wanderlusting for it). Yes, you can contact me on facebook if you want.
Last edited by Massimiliano B on 2016-06-06, 22:50, edited 1 time in total.


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